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Abstract—Existing permissionless blockchain solutions rely
on peer-to-peer propagation mechanisms, where nodes in a
network transfer transaction they received to their neighbors.
Unfortunately, there is no explicit incentive for such transaction
propagation. Therefore, existing propagation mechanisms will
not be sustainable in a fully decentralized blockchain with
rational nodes. In this work, we formally define the problem
of incentivizing nodes for transaction propagation. We propose
an incentive mechanism where each node involved in the prop-
agation of a transaction receives a share of the transaction fee.
We also show that our proposal is Sybil-proof. Furthermore, we
combine the incentive mechanism with smart routing to reduce
the communication and storage costs at the same time. The
proposed routing mechanism reduces the redundant transaction
propagation from the size of the network to a factor of average
shortest path length. The routing mechanism is built upon a
specific type of consensus protocol where the round leader who
creates the transaction block is known in advance. Note that
our routing mechanism is a generic one and can be adopted
independently from the incentive mechanism.
Index Terms—Blockchain, transaction propagation, incentive,
routing.
I. INTRODUCTION
In this work, we investigate transaction propagation on per-
missionless blockchains with respect to incentive compatibility
and bandwidth efficiency. The former, incentive compatibility,
is an essential component of permissionless blockchain to
maintain its functionality with rational participants [1], [2].
The latter, bandwidth efficiency, is an important factor for
efficient use of limited resources available in the network.
Although a number of works have studied incentive com-
patibility problem of blockchains, they are limited to min-
ing mechanism, e.g. investigating selfish mining attacks [3]–
[6], and block withholding attacks [7]–[10]. The existing
blockchain solutions such as Bitcoin [11] and Ethereum [12]
do not pay attention to incentives for transaction propagation in
the network. This is due to the fact that the mining networks
in those solutions are centralized in practice [13]–[15] and
thus, they do not exhibit a fully decentralized structure. There
are only two works that address incentive compatibility of
transaction propagation in blockchain by Babaioff et al. [16]
and Abraham et al. [17]. Unfortunately, both works suggest
a specific solution for the incentive compatibility but do
not provide a formal definition of the problem. Furthermore,
the proposed solutions are also designed for certain network
topologies.
In terms of bandwidth inefficiency, existing solutions suffer
from multiple broadcasting of the same transaction over the
network. For example, in Bitcoin, each transaction is received
by the nodes (miners) in the network twice: once during
the advertisement, i.e. broadcasting of the transaction at the
beginning, and once after the validation, i.e. broadcasting
of the block including the transaction. While validation is
essential since each node in the network stores every validated
transaction, the advertisement does not need to be received by
all nodes. However, redundancy for advertisement is inevitable
in such cases where the round leader who creates the validated
block is unknown in advance since the transaction needs to be
broadcast to all potential round leaders. In recent blockchain
proposals where the round leader is known in advance, what
we call first-leader-then-block (FLTB) type of consensus pro-
tocols [18]–[21], it is possible to improve bandwidth efficiency
by reducing the communication cost by directly routing the
transaction to the round leader. To the best of our knowledge,
there is no prior work on optimizing bandwidth efficiency for
fully decentralized blockchain.
In this work, our contribution is three-fold: 1) Sybil-proof
incentive compatible propagation mechanism, 2) bandwidth-
efficient routing mechanism, and 3) bandwidth and storage
efficient transaction propagation mechanism which combines
the first two mechanisms.
We formally define incentive compatibility of propagation
mechanisms in fully decentralized blockchain networks. We
show that there is no Sybil-proof and incentive compati-
ble propagation mechanism for poorly connected networks
(specifically for 1-connected networks). For other network
topologies, we find the following incentive compatible and
Sybil-proof formula, which distributes the transaction fee
among propagating nodes:
fk[i] =
{
F · C(1− C)i−1 for i < k,
F · (1− C)k−1 for i = k,
where F is the fee, k is the length of the propagation path, fk[i]
is the share of the ith node in that path, and C is a parameter
related to the network topology. The incentive mechanism is
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independent of the choice of consensus protocol and works
with any consensus protocol.
We propose a routing mechanism compatible with FLTB-
type consensus protocols. Our proposal reduces the commu-
nication cost of the transaction propagation from the size of
the network to the scale of average shortest path length. In a
random network topology of more than 500 nodes, we achieve
over 97% communication cost reduction compared to de facto
propagation mechanism for the advertisement. Furthermore,
we also present a propagation mechanism which combines our
incentive and routing mechanisms in a storage and bandwidth
efficient way. For incentive mechanism, our combined protocol
requires storing only a single signature to provide the integrity
of the path, unlike the existing works, which use a signature
chain including signatures of each node in the path.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section II
presents the related work. Our blockchain model and notations
are defined in Section III. Section IV formulates requirements
of the incentive problem and computes the generic solution.
Smart routing mechanism is presented in Section V and
combined with incentive mechanism in Section VI.
II. RELATED WORK
The lack of incentive for information propagation in a
peer-to-peer network has been known and studied in different
settings [22]–[25]. Kleinberg and Raghavan [24] proposed an
incentive scheme for finding the answer for a given query in
a tree-structured network topology. Li et al. [25] focused on
node discovery in a homogeneous network where each node
has the same probability of having an answer for the query.
In [22], [23], the authors analyzed the incentive problem for
multi-level marketing which rewards referrals if the advertise-
ment produces a purchase. In these marketing models, the
reward is shared among all nodes in the tree including the
propagation path.
The proposed solutions for peer-to-peer networks [22]–[25]
are not applicable for the permissionless blockchains. In peer-
to-peer solutions, nodes are asked to provide a specific datum
like the position of a peer or the answer to a query. In
blockchains, however, transaction propagation is requested to
advertise the transactions and eventually place them into a
valid block. Alternatively, finding an answer to a query is
equivalent to validation of a transaction by round leader in the
blockchain. Query propagation in a peer-to-peer network has
two main differences compared to a blockchain transaction
propagation: nodes do not compete against the ones who
forwarded the message to them and nodes cannot generate a
response to a query that they do not have the answer, i.e. either
they have the right answer or not. Whereas in a blockchain,
a block is generated by the round leader and every node is a
potential round leader. Essentially, nodes in a blockchain are
competitors that have an incentive not to propagate whereas
other peer-to-peer nodes do not have the incentive since they
cannot generate the answer to the query by themselves.
Recently, blockchain oriented propagation mechanisms have
been proposed [16], [17]. In [16], Babaioff et al. uncovered
the incentive problem in the Bitcoin system where a rational
node (miner) has no incentive to propagate a transaction. They
focused on a specific type of network, namely regular d-ary
directed tree with a height H , and assumed that each node
has the same processing power. In that setting, the authors
proposed a hybrid incentive (rewarding) scheme and proved
that it is also Sybil-proof. In [17], Abraham et al. proposed
a consensus mechanism, Solidus, offering an incentive to
propagate transactions and validated blocks (puzzles). In their
incentive mechanism, the amount of processing fee passed to
the next node is determined by the sender. Both works rely on
a signature chain to prevent any manipulation over the path
and thereby, to secure the shares of propagating nodes.
[16] and [17] provided analyses of their proposals based on
game theory. For the analysis, [16] assumes a tree-structured
network which eliminates the case of competition against com-
mon neighbors and it is not realistic for blockchain network
topology. Whereas, the analysis in [17] is limited to the case
of competition between nodes that have common neighbors.
For bandwidth efficiency, to the best of our knowledge,
there is no prior work for fully decentralized blockchain
without dedicated miners (round leaders). Nevertheless, Li et
al. [25] presented a distributed routing scheme for peer-to-peer
networks. The authors focused on one-to-one routing which is
dedicated to a single target node. Whereas in blockchain it
needs to be one-to-all routing, which connects the complete
network to the round leader. In addition, [25] does not take
into account the possibility of a failing routing caused by a
failing or malicious node in the routing path.
III. OUR BLOCKCHAIN MODEL AND NOTATIONS
In this section, we describe our blockchain model and the
notation used in the paper.
Network. It is a dynamic peer-to-peer network means that
there are nodes joining and leaving constantly. Unlike to the
existing works [16], [17], we do not have a restriction on the
network topology.
Participants. Each participant is denoted by a node in the net-
work. We assume a permissionless blockchain where anyone
can participate and contribute to the ledger directly. Moreover,
there is no discrimination between nodes (participants), i.e.,
they can all be the owner of a transaction and propose a block
as a miner (round leader). For identification, each node has a
public and private key pair and can be validated by his public
key.
Consensus and leader election. Incentive mechanism defined
in Section IV works regardless of the consensus structure.
Whereas, the routing mechanism requires special treatment,
which we call first-leader-then-block (FLTB) type consensus
protocols.
FLTB protocols can be defined as the consensus model
where the round leader is validated before he proposes the
block. Any leader election mechanism which is independent
of the prospective block of that leader can be converted
into FLTB type. Examples of the FLTB consensus protocols
are Proof-of-Work (PoW) based Bitcoin-NG [18] and several
Proof-of-Stake (PoS) based ones [19]–[21].
The rest of the definitions and notations are listed below:
• Neighbor nodes: Directly connected nodes in the network,
adjacency in the graph.
• Client: The source or the sender of a transaction. Client
of a transaction T , denoted by cT .
• Round Leader: The legitimate node (participant) who
constructs the current block.
• Intermediary Node: A node on the transmission path
between the round leader and a client.
• Lr: The credential of round leader which validates the
round leader of round r and can be verified by all nodes
in the network. For example, it could be a special hash
value in a PoW protocol or the proof of possessing the
chosen coin in a PoS protocol. In general, regardless
of the consensus mechanism, credentials are linked to
the public key of the leader and can be verified by a
corresponding signature.
• pi(ni): The probability of node ni being the round leader,
also referred as the capacity of node ni. It corresponds
to the mining power in PoW or the stake size in PoS
protocols and is assumed to be greater than zero for
every node in the network. pi(S) corresponds to the total
capacity of the all nodes in set S.
• N TK : The set of nodes who know (received) the transac-
tion T . Nn,TK presents the set from the point of view of
node n (including n itself).
• N TNK : The set of nodes who do not know (received)
transaction T yet. Nn,TNK denotes the set from the point
of view of node n and includes only the neighbors of n.
IV. INCENTIVE MECHANISM
We now describe our incentive mechanism. For the sus-
tainable functioning of a fully decentralized blockchain where
the nodes (participants) are able to create new identities and
behave according to their incentives, propagation mechanism
needs to be Sybil-proof and incentive compatible [1].
Conventional incentive instrument, namely transaction fee,
almost always refers to the reward of the round leader.
Here, we refer transaction fee as it consists of the reward
to propagate and to validate transactions. Thereby, rational
nodes are encouraged not only to validate transactions but
also to propagate them. How to determine the fee is out of
the scope of this paper but we assume that each transaction
fee is predefined by either the client or a known function. We
focus on how to automatically allocate the fee among all the
contributors of the process.
Fee sharing function (rewarding mechanism). The fee
sharing function distributes the transaction fee among the
propagating nodes and the round leader. Note that it is highly
probable that the same transaction is received more than once
by the round leader (and intermediary nodes) because of the
propagation mechanism. A rational round leader would choose
the one which maximizes his profit. Like existing works [16],
[17], the fee sharing function described here deals with the
path which is included in the block. For a transaction (added
to the block) with fee F and propagation path P , the function
F determines the shares of each node involved:
F : {F, P} −→ {f |P |[i] }|P |i=1 where
|P |∑
i=1
f
|P |
[i] = F.
|P | denotes the number of nodes involved in the processing
of a transaction with fee F , where |P | − 1 of the nodes
are in the propagation path between the client and the round
leader. Let |P | = k, i.e., length of the propagation path of the
transaction is k. Then, f |P |[i] denotes the share of i
th node in
the propagation path, fk[k] is the share of the round leader and∑k
i=1 f
k
[i] = F .
In the rest of the section, we formulate the necessities of the
fee sharing function to incentivize propagation of an arbitrary
transaction T with fee F . An ideal incentive compatible prop-
agation mechanism should satisfy the following properties:
1) Sybil-proofness: An intermediary node, as well as the
round leader, should not benefit from introducing Sybil
nodes to the network.
2) Game theoretically soundness: A transaction should not
be kept among a subset of the network. There should
be adequate incentive for rational nodes willing to
propagate, thence it will eventually reach to the whole
network.
By formulating these conditions, we achieve the following
theorem (where C is a constant which can be chosen according
to the network connectivity):
Theorem 1. In a 2- or more connected blockchain network,
each rational node n ∈ N TK with pi(n) < C · pi(Nn,TK )
propagates transaction T without introducing Sybil nodes, if
the transaction fee F is shared by the following method:
fk[i] =
{
F · C(1− C)i−1 for 1 ≤ i < k,
F · (1− C)k−1 for i = k.
Proof of the theorem is divided into the following sections.
The requirements are formulated in Sections IV-A and IV-B,
and the fee sharing function satisfying them is computed in
Section IV-C.
A. Sybil-Proofness
Here, we use the same definition of Sybil nodes in [16]: fake
identities sharing the same neighbors with the original node
that do not increase the connectivity of the network. Because
of the Sybil-proof consensus algorithm, Sybil nodes do not
increase the capacity of their owner, i.e., the probability of
being the round leader.
We investigate the problem in two different settings: 1-
connected networks and the rest. k-connected network means
that removal of any k − 1 nodes does not disconnect the
network. In 1-connected networks, there exists a bridge which
is the only connection between two distinct subnetworks.
Though 1-connected network model seems to be unrealistic
topology for permissionless blockchains, it is important to see
the intuition behind the non-competition effect.
1-connected networks. In 1-connected networks, there are
critical nodes which have special positions in the propagation
paths between some node pairs. A critical node for a node
pair appears in all possible paths between these two nodes.
The following lemma shows that non-competing advantage
of critical nodes makes it impossible to have a Sybil-proof
incentive mechanism for 1-connected networks.
Lemma 2 (Impossibility Lemma). For 1-connected networks,
there is no Sybil-proof and incentive compatible propagation
mechanism which rewards every node in the propagation path.
Proof. Assume that, because of 1-connectedness of the net-
work, a node ni have a critical position for a transaction
T , meaning that it is certain he will be included in the
propagation path of that transaction. If ni is one side of the
bridge combining two distinct subnetworks, ni can be sure that
each transaction coming from its subnetwork and validated in
the other one has to pass through ni. In Figure 1, we illustrate
the two possible paths of a transaction passing through ni.
Since the round leader and also intermediary nodes after ni
will receive one of the paths, they do not have any choice but
accept the path sent by ni.
· · · · · ·
cT
f k[1] f
k
[i−1] f
k
[i] f
k
[i+1] f
k
[k−1] f
k
[k]
n1 ni−1 ni ni+1 nk−1 nk
· · · · · ·f k+1[1] f
k+1
[i−1] f
k+1
[i] f
k+1
[i+2] f
k+1
[k] f
k+1
[k+1]
n′i
f k+1[i+1]
Fig. 1. The fee sharing before and after a Sybil node ni′ added by ni
Now, we investigate the share of a node ni with and without
a Sybil node. As given in Figure 1, ni is the ith node in the
original propagation path and his corresponding fee shares are
fk[i] and f
k+1
[i] + f
k+1
[i+1]. In order to demotivate ni, f
k
[i] should
be greater than or equal to fk+1[i] +f
k+1
[i+1]. Since the position of
the node would change for different transactions and rounds,
the condition should hold for all positions:
∀ i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, fk[i] ≥ fk+1[i] + fk+1[i+1]
(summing for all i’s) =⇒
k∑
i=1
fk[i] ≥
k∑
i=1
fk+1[i] +
k∑
i=1
fk+1[i+1]
(Definition of F) =⇒ F ≥ F − fk+1[k+1] + F − fk+1[1]
=⇒ fk+1[k+1] + fk+1[1] ≥ F
(Definition of F) =⇒ fk+1[k+1] + fk+1[1] = F .
Therefore, other than the first propagating node and the round
leader, there is no reward for the rest of the propagating nodes
which contradicts with rational behavior.
Eclipse and partitioning. Note that this monopolized behav-
ior is similar to the eclipse and partitioning attacks where the
adversary separates the network into two distinct group and
controls all the connections between them [26], [27]. Indeed,
Lemma 2 can be generalized to the case where the adversary is
able to control all the outgoing connections of a client. In that
case, there is no way to deviate the adversary from creating
Sybil nodes for that specific transaction. We assume that client
nodes are able to defend against the eclipse attacks using the
countermeasures defined in [26].
In a 2- or more connected network, there are multiple paths
between any two nodes. Therefore, we can immediately focus
on the multiple paths case where there are competing paths
for the same transaction and the round leader includes one of
them to the block.
A node can profit from a fee by either being an interme-
diary node who propagates it or being the round leader who
creates the block. We investigate the Sybil-proof conditions of
intermediary nodes and the round leader separately.
a) Intermediary nodes: An intermediary node can be de-
viated by the actions of the nodes who receive the transaction
afterwards. Since there are multiple paths, the round leader
will receive the same transaction from at least two different
paths. In other words, the round leader would decline all but
one of the paths (for each transaction). An intermediary node
will be demotivated if introducing a Sybil node would increase
the chance of rejection of his path.
If the share of the round leader decreases as the propagation
path length increases, then he will choose the shortest path
for each transaction. In that case, introducing Sybil nodes will
decrease his chance to be included in the block. Therefore,
providing larger gain to the leader for choosing the shortest
path is sufficient and can be formulated as fk[k] > f
k+1
[k+1].
b) Round leader: In some cases, round leader is de-
termined before the block is created or even several rounds
earlier [18]–[20]. Since the round leader is guaranteed to be
in the propagation path, it is needed to be taken into account
separately. In addition, an intermediary node can propagate
righteously to his neighbors and then add Sybil nodes for his
own mining process. Therefore, in any case (predefined leader
or not), it is necessary to make an additional policy for the
round leader.
In the case of s Sybil nodes, share of the round leader will
change from fk[k] to
∑s
i=0 f
k+s
[k+i] for some k. In order to deviate
the round leader, fk[k] ≥
∑s
i=0 f
k+s
[k+i] is required.
Since the latter condition includes the former one (as
fk+1[k] > 0), Sybil proofness condition can be formulated as:
∀ k ≥ 1,∀ s ≥ 1, fk[k] ≥
s∑
i=0
fk+s[k+i] . (1)
B. Incentive Compatibility
The decision of the propagation of a transaction can be
analyzed as a simultaneous move game where each party takes
action without knowing strategies of the others. All players
(nodes in our case) are assumed to be rational and they decide
their actions deducing that the others will also act rationally.
Some nodes may cooperate with each other. We assume that
colluding neighboring nodes already share every transaction
with each other and take actions as one. In other words, they
act as a single combined node in the network which can be
seen as Sybil nodes.
Here, we investigate the propagation decision by comparing
the change in the expected rewards for a transaction T . In the
beginning, each transaction is shared with some nodes, at least
with the neighbors of the client. We will find the required
condition to propagate through the whole network. We first
investigate the propagation decision by comparing the change
in the expected rewards immediately after the action. Then,
we extend our analysis with a permanence condition which
guarantees that the ones who propagate will not suffer from
any future actions.
We show that the sharing decision of a node is independent
of the probability of his neighboring nodes being the round
leader. Instead, it depends on his own probability against the
rest who knows the transaction.
Lemma 3 (Equity Lemma). Propagation decision of a node
is independent from the neighbors’ capacities. A rational node
would propagate to either all of its neighbors or none of them.
Proof. Let a transaction T with fee F is known by a node n,
and its distance to the cT is k. The expected reward of node
n can be defined as a function R(·) whose input corresponds
to the capacities of the nodes who received T from n, then
R(X) =
fk[k] · pi(n) + fk+1[k] ·X
pi(Nn,TK ) +X
.
We show that R(·) is a monotone function. In order to show
that a function is a monotone, it is enough to show that the
sign of its derivative does not change in the domain range.
For our case, it can be seen that the sign is independent of the
input:
R′(X)=
fk+1[k]
(
pi(Nn,TK ) +X
)
−
(
fk[k]pi(n) + f
k+1
[k] X
)
(
pi(Nn,TK ) +X
)2
=
fk+1[k] pi(Nn,TK )− fk[k]pi(n)(
pi(Nn,TK ) +X
)2 .
Since R(·) is a monotone function, then it achieves the
maximum value at one of the boundary values. In our case, the
boundary values are X = 0 where no neighbors received the
transaction and X = pi
(
Nn,TNK
)
where all neighbors received
it. Here, we omit the fact that pi(·) is also a monotone function.
Thus, we can say that a rational node maximizes his profit by
propagating to either all of its neighbors or none of them.
Lemma 3 simplifies to evaluate interfering multiple node
decisions which is discussed in the following Lemma.
Lemma 4 (Propagation Lemma). Let a node n ∈ N TK ,
Nn,TNK 6= ∅ where the distance between n and cT is k. All
neighbors of n will be aware of T if
fk+1[k]
fk[k]
>
pi(n)
pi(Nn,TK )
.
Proof. Assume that some of the neighbors of n are not aware
of T , i.e., Nn,TNK 6= ∅. From Lemma 3, we know that n did not
propagate the transaction to any of his neighbors. Therefore,
at the moment, the only way that n profits from T is being
the round leader with a reward fk[k].
Table I presents expected reward of n with respect to each
possible action of n and Nn,TK . The propagation decision of
Nn,TK may not include all its members, thereby all possible
decisions are taken into account. Here, CN corresponds to the
common neighbors of n and Nn,TK , NCN1 distinct neighbors
of n and NCN2 distinct neighbors of Nn,TK (who decide
to propagate), i.e., CN
⋃
NCN1 = Nn,TNK . Since CN is
received the transaction from both n and the rest of the Nn,TK ,
α represents the percentage of the ones in CN decided to
continue with the one including n.
If all nodes of Nn,TK decide not to propagate with their
neighbors, then n will benefit from propagating T in the case
of
fk[k]·pi(n)+fk+1[k] ·pi(N
n,T
NK )
pi(Nn,TK )+pi(Nn,TNK )
>
fk[k]·pi(n)
pi(Nn,TK )
⇐⇒ f
k+1
[k]
fk
[k]
> pi(n)
pi(Nn,TK )
.
If (some) nodes in Nn,TK decide to propagate T , then n will
benefit from propagating T in the case of
fk[k]·pi(n)+fk+1[k] ·pi(NCN1)+αfk+1[k] ·pi(CN)
pi(Nn,TK )+pi(Nn,TNK )+pi(NCN2)
>
fk[k]·pi(n)
pi(Nn,TK )+pi(CN)+pi(NCN2)
⇐= f
k+1
[k]
fk
[k]
> pi(n)
pi(Nn,TK )+pi(CN)+pi(NCN2)
and NCN1 6= ∅.
Note that NCN1 = ∅ means that all the neighbors of n are
also neighbors of Nn,TK who decide to propagate. In addition,
the sufficiency condition is independent of α. Therefore, in
any case, if
fk+1
[k]
fk
[k]
> pi(n)
pi(Nn,TK )
is satisfied, then all neighbors of
n will be aware of the transaction.
Corollary 5. Let fk+1[k] ≥ C · fk[k] for some constant C ∈
(0, 1). N TK will continue to expand until there is no more node
n ∈ N TK having neighbors in N TNK and satisfying pi(n) <
C · pi(Nn,TK ).
Remark I. Here, it is possible to define different Ck values for
each distance k, i.e., fk+1[k] ≥ Ck · fk[k]. One might argue that,
as the distance increases, it could be possible to find nodes
satisfying pi(n)
pi(Nn,TK )
< Ck for smaller Ck values. However, as
seen in Section VI, this is not always the case. In addition,
the intermediate node may not know the exact distance, thus
using the same C value would make the decision simpler.
Remark II. Note that the propagation decision is based on
Nn,TK instead of N TK since the latter one may not be available.
This could lead to better consequences for propagation because
nodes may predict N TK greater than its actual size and decide
TABLE I
THE EXPECTED REWARD OF n FROM T REGARDING POSSIBLE DECISIONS OF n AND THE REST OF Nn,TK .
Nn,TK (excluding n)
Decision Not Propagate (some) Propagate
n
Not Propagate
fk[k]·pi(n)
pi(Nn,T
K
)
fk[k]·pi(n)
pi(Nn,T
K
)+pi(CN)+pi(NCN2)
Propagate
fk[k]·pi(n)+f
k+1
[k]
·pi(Nn,T
NK
)
pi(Nn,T
K
)+pi(Nn,T
NK
)
fk[k]·pi(n)+f
k+1
[k]
·pi(NCN1)+αfk+1[k] ·pi(CN)
pi(Nn,T
K
)+pi(Nn,T
NK
)+pi(NCN2)
accordingly. Nonetheless, a carefully chosen C value will lead
the nodes to share it with an overwhelming probability.
Remark III. Being the round leader should be more appealing
than being an intermediary node, thus the round leader would
try to fulfill the round block capacity to maximize his profit.
The system may not work at full capacity if the nodes gain
the same reward from propagating instead of validating (as
the round leader) transactions. In Corollary 5, the propagation
condition is given as fk+1[k] ≥ C · fk[k]. We fix the condition in
favor of the round leader:
∀ k, fk+1[k] = C · fk[k] . (2)
Permanence condition. In the simultaneous move analysis,
we investigated one step at a time, i.e., what will happen
immediately after the decision of propagation. However, all
possible future actions should be taken into account. For
example, the sender of a transaction should consider the pos-
sibility of the further propagation done by the receiver. From
Lemma 3, capacities of the neighboring nodes do not have
any influence on the sharing decision. Unless the processing
fee share decreases, which is caused by some possible future
actions like increased path length, the same lemma will be
satisfied. If the share of a propagating node is non-decreasing
with respect to the path length, then the ones who propagate
will not suffer from any future actions. This can be formulated
as
∀ i < k, fk[i] ≥ fk+1[i] . (3)
C. Fee Sharing Function
With the equations obtained from the required conditions,
we can uniquely determine the fee sharing function and
conclude Theorem 1. First, using permanence condition (3),
Sybil-proofness condition (1), can be reduced to fk[k] ≥
fk+1[k+1] + f
k+1
[k] :
∀ k ≥ 1, fk[k]≥ fk+1[k+1] + fk+1[k] ≥ fk+2[k+2] + fk+2[k+1] + fk+1[k]
≥ fk+3[k+3] + fk+3[k+2] + fk+2[k+1] + fk+1[k] ≥ · · ·
∀ s ≥ 1, ≥ fk+s[k+s] +
s−1∑
i=0
fk+i+1[k+i] ≥ fk+s[k+s] +
s−1∑
i=0
fk+s[k+i].
Therefore, we can update the Sybil-proofness condition as:
∀ k ≥ 1, fk[k] ≥ fk+1[k+1] + fk+1[k] . (4)
Then, we can obtain the following equations:
Using (4)
k∑
i=1
f i[i] ≥
k∑
i=1
f i+1[i+1] +
k∑
i=1
f i+1[i]
=⇒ F = f1[1] ≥ fk+1[k+1] +
k∑
i=1
f i+1[i]
Using (3) =⇒ F ≥ fk+1[k+1] +
k∑
i=1
fk+1[i] = F
=⇒ fk[i] = fk+1[i] and fk[k] = fk+1[k+1] + fk+1[k] . (5)
After all, we can finalize the fee sharing function which
corresponds to Theorem 1. Using (2) and (5), the share of
the round leader can be computed:
fk[k] = f
k−1
[k−1](1− C) = · · · = F · (1− C)k−1. (6)
Using (5) and (6), the share of an intermediary node can be
computed:
∀ i < k, fk[i] = f i+1[i] = F · C(1− C)i−1 .
D. Discussion
Integration. Implementation of the incentive mechanism
should take into account the security and efficiency concerns.
The propagation path should be immutable in a way that an
adversary cannot add or subtract any node neither in the propa-
gation process nor after the block generation. At the same time,
storage efficiency is also essential since these path logs are
needed to be stored in the ledger by every node. Both existing
incentive-compatible blockchain solutions [16], [17] adopted a
signature chaining mechanism where each propagated message
includes the public key of the receiver and signature of the
sender. This protocol prevents any manipulation over the path
and thereby secures the shares of each contributor. It requires
additional storage which is the signatures of the contributors.
Although signature chaining solution requires the knowledge
of the public key of the receiver and stores signatures of each
sender, it is generic and can be applied to any blockchain. In
Section VI, we present a novel and storage-efficient solution
which is feasible for FLTB blockchains. It is embedded into
routing mechanism and does not require the knowledge of the
public keys of the neighboring nodes.
Determining C parameter. C value plays an important role
to make sure that there will be incentive to propagate a transac-
tion for some nodes until it reaches to the whole network. On
the one hand, as the choice for the C value increases, it will
be easier to satisfy the propagation condition since there will
be more chance to find nodes satisfying pi(n) < C · pi(N TK).
On the other hand, the higher C value, the lower fee remains
for the rest of the propagation path. It significantly reduces
the fee of the round leader, thereby the incentive. For these
reasons, it is required to choose a moderate C value, e.g., a
reasonable choice would be C = 2Ncon where Ncon denotes
default number of connections of a node. For example, in
Bitcoin network where Ncon = 8, nodes will propagate unless
they assume that their mining power is greater than 25% of
the ones having the transaction. Even at the very beginning,
at least Ncon nodes have the transaction, C = 2Ncon setting
would provide overwhelming probability to have nodes willing
to propagate according to Corollary 5.
Client (0−capacity) nodes. The main goal of the propagation
incentive mechanism is to make sure that the transactions
are received by the nodes who are capable of validating
transactions as well as creating blocks. For that reason, we
mainly focused on the nodes having a capacity greater than
zero, i.e., pi(·) > 0. Nevertheless, a client node can be seen as
a potential capacity node because of the possible propagation
of the client. Regarding Lemma 3 and permanence condition
(3), a rational node, who decided to propagate, would benefit
from propagating to the client nodes as well. At the same
time, a client node will always benefit from propagating any
transaction since otherwise it will not have any chance to gain
a fee.
Decentralization effect. In the conventional permissionless
blockchains, all rewards including block reward and trans-
action fees are given to the block owner. In other words,
nodes have only one incentive to participate in the network:
being round leader. The less chance individual nodes have
to be the round leader, the more they are motivated to
join into centralized forms (e.g. mining pools) [13], [28].
Conversely, the transaction fee is shared with all propagators
nodes. In addition, since many transactions are included in a
single block, aiming processing fees of (some) transactions
has significantly more chance than being the round leader.
Thereby, it is reasonable to conclude that incentive mechanism
would have a positive impact on the decentralization of the
permissionless blockchains.
V. ROUTING MECHANISM
As a non-hierarchical peer-to-peer network, the blockchain
ledger is validated by all nodes (miners) individually. This
requires broadcasting every data and blocks over the network
since every node needs to keep a record of the chain to validate
new blocks. In existing permissionless blockchains, every
transaction is broadcast throughout the network by the client,
then the new block including (some of) these is constructed
and broadcast by the round leader. Hence, each transaction is
broadcast at least twice. Even more (inv) messages are sent
to check the awareness of the neighbors on the transaction.
In Nakamoto-like consensus protocols, the round leader is
validated simultaneously with his proposed block where the
redundant propagation of the client is inevitable. In FLTB
protocols, on the other hand, it is possible to validate the round
leader before the block is proposed. It enables to determine
a direct route between each client and the round leader. Our
routing mechanism in Algorithm 1 finds the shortest paths
between clients and the round leader for each round. Instead
of sending each transaction to all nodes in the network, it is
relayed over the shortest path between the client and the leader.
The distance between (almost) any two nodes in a connected
graph is dramatically smaller than the size of the network [29].
This is equivalent to cost reduction from O(N) to O(lnN) in
a random network of size N [30], [31].
The treat model of routing mechanism we present in this
section considers a malicious adversary rather than a rational
one. In the routing mechanism, a malicious adversary may try
to block or censor some of the transaction propagations.
Our protocol can be divided into two parts: Recognition
Phase where the routes are determined and Transaction Phase
where the transactions are propagated (see Figure 2). First,
in the recognition phase, the round leader is recognized
throughout the network and his credential is propagated with
a standard gossip protocol. Each node ni learns his closest
node towards the round leader, gradient node (gni), who is
the first node forwarding the credential. In the transaction
phase, each client forwards his transaction to (some of) his
neighbors. Then, each node, receiving a transaction for the
first time, directly transmits to his gradient node. Here, the
reason for clients to broadcast to more than one neighbor is
that one path could yield a single point of failure. It could
be caused by the nodes who fail or maliciously censor some
of the transactions. As presented in the experimental results,
forwarding transaction to a few of the neighbors (precisely
Ncon) is sufficient. Note that, the routing mechanism works
under asynchronous network assumptions since a client does
not have to wait for all nodes but Ncon of his neighbors. Sim-
ilarly, for an intermediary node, waiting for the first credential
message is enough to propagate received transactions.
Lr
Lr
LrL
r
Lr
Lr
Lr
Lr
Fig. 2. The Routing Mechanism. The left one illustrates the Recognition
Phase and connections to the gradient nodes are shown with bold solid lines.
On the right, three clients and their transaction paths are presented.
Locational privacy. There have been several papers investi-
gating anonymity in the permissionless blockchain networks,
especially for the Bitcoin network [32]–[34]. It is found out
that matching public keys and IP addresses can be done by
eavesdropping. In this manner, FLTB-based blockchains may
expose to DoS (denial-of-service) attacks against to the round
Algorithm 1 The Routing Algorithm
Recognition Phase
Leader provides his credential Lr to his neighbors.
for Node n1 to nN do
if First time receiving Lr then
Store ID of the sender (gradient) node nj , i.e.,
gni ← nj
Propagate Lr to neighbors.
end if
end for
Transaction Phase
Client provides transaction T to his neighbors.
for Each node ni receiving T do
if First time receiving T then
Send it to the gni
end if
end for
leader. We want to stress that our routing mechanism does
not leak any more locational information about the position
of the leader other than the original FLTB protocols do. It just
takes advantage of the announcement of the leader which is
done exactly in the same manner with the FLTB protocols.
Therefore, our routing mechanism does not cause any addi-
tional vulnerabilities for DoS-like attacks against the round
leader. Yet, it is possible to improve the locational privacy via
anonymity phase where the message is first forwarded in a
line of nodes, then diffused from there [35]. The extra cost
of anonymity would be a few nodes on the line which is still
proportional to the logarithmic size of the network.
A. Experimental Results
In this experiment, we use Baraba´si-Albert (BA) graph
model [30] which simulates peer discovery in a peer-to-peer
network. It starts with a well-connected small graph and each
new node is connected to some of the previous nodes with a
probability proportional to their degrees.
Baraba´si-Albert (BA) [30] and Erdo˝s-Re´nyi (ER) [31] graph
models have been used to simulate permissionless blockchains
[36], [37]. In our setting, we combine both models where the
network starts with a small ER graph and grows according to
BA model. We start with 50 nodes in ER model [31] with edge
probability of 1/2, meaning that on average each node has 25
connections. Then, each new node is added by connecting with
Ncon nodes in the network. For each (N,Ncon) pair analyzed,
we generated various graphs using Python graph library [38].
Bandwidth gain. In [39], the average shortest path length
between any two nodes, i.e., the average path length, of a
BA graph is shown to be in the order of lnNln lnN . Hence,
our routing protocol reduces the communication cost of a
message transaction from O(N) to O(Ncon · lnNln lnN ). The
communication gain is up to 99% for scaled networks (see
Figure 3), which can be verified by counting the average
number of nodes visited per transaction. Here, we assume that
the first arriving credential is coming from the node which is
closest to the leader with respect to the number of nodes in
between. In other words, the delay between any two nodes is
computed by the node-distance.
In Figure 3, we count only one redundant communication
for each transaction. Even more redundancy is caused by the
flooding of each transaction because the same transaction is
received from different neighboring nodes. In other words, the
total redundancy is not N , but on average Ncon · N . In the
existing blockchains, this additional redundancy is reduced by
the sending the hash of the transaction to check whether the
neighbor has it or not. If storage size of the transaction is
relative to the size of the hash, then the total number of relays
of a transaction would be significantly more than double of the
network size. For example, Statoshi info [40], a block explorer
of Bitcoin, shows that average incoming bandwidth usage for
the transactions (tx) is, 2.87 KBps, less than for the checking
messages (inv), 4.12 KBps (measurements taken between
02:00 AM and 14:00 PM in 13 of Feb. 2018). To conclude,
since our mechanism does not suffer from the flooding effect,
the actual communication gain would be much higher than the
result in Figure 3.
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Fig. 3. Communication cost for advertisement of a transaction.
Failing transmissions. Since each transaction is propagated
among a small set of nodes, we need to take into account
the possibility of propagation failure which can be caused
by the nodes who fail or censor the transaction. The fail-
ure probability of a transaction can be approximated by(
1− (1− h) lnNln lnN−1
)Ncon
where h denotes the probability
of a node in the network who fails or censors the transaction.
These failing nodes are the ones who were present at the
recognition phase and failed just afterwards. Long-term offline
nodes can be ignored since they will not be chosen as gradient
nodes. Thus, Figure 4 demonstrates that our routing is robust
against instant network fluctuations. For a blockchain network
with N = 10000 and Ncon = 8, similar to Bitcoin network, if
30% of the active nodes fail after the recognition phase, only
9% of the transactions will be affected.
VI. COMBINED PROPAGATION MECHANISM
In this section, we show how to deploy both of the incentive
and routing mechanisms for any blockchain having a FLTB
consensus protocol. At first glance, they seem to conflict
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where h is the probability of an intermediary node being a failing or censoring
node.
with each other because the incentive mechanism is used to
encourage propagation while the routing mechanism helps
to reduce redundant propagation. We combine them in a
way that rational nodes are encouraged to propagate only
the transactions which are coming from the predefined paths
of the routing mechanism. As demonstrated in Algorithm 2,
we use the same infrastructure with the routing mechanism,
and we include proofs of the intermediary nodes such that
their contributions cannot be denied. Each transaction path
is defined and secured by a path identifier which includes
the public keys of the propagating nodes. Blocks consist of
transactions as well as their path identifiers used to claim
processing fee shares.
In the recognition phase, each intermediary node conveys
the leader credential and the path identifier. Incoming and
outgoing path identifiers of a node n are denoted by INn
and OUTn, which are used to validate and secure the propa-
gation path. The round leader ` produces the initial identifier,
OUT` = H(Lr, PK`), and propagates to his neighbors. Each
node n updates the identifier coming from the gradient node by
OUTn = H(INn, PKn). This operation is done just for the
gradient node (first one sending Lr), then updated identifier
and the credential are forwarded to the neighbors. Nodes may
ignore the subsequent identifiers except a client who stores the
first Ncon ones for the transaction phase.
After the routing paths are determined, each client delivers
the signed transaction and the incoming identifier to his Ncon
neighbors. The first receiving nodes, check the signature, then
add their public keys to the transaction and forward it to their
gradient nodes. From that point, each intermediary node in the
path first checks the validity of the path via the public keys
included and his own identifier, then forwards the transaction
including his public key to the gradient node.
Once transactions are received by the round leader, he
includes the valid ones into the block. The block consists of the
credential, hash of the previous block and valid transactions
with their paths. Then, the block is propagated throughout the
network.
Incentive for block propagation. As a consequence of the in-
Algorithm 2 The Combined Propagation Algorithm
Recognition Phase
Leader l propagates Lr
for Each node ni do
if First time receiving Lr and INn′ then
if Lr is valid then
Assign INni ← INn′ and gradient node as n′
Compute OUTni = H(INni , PKni)
Propagate Lr and OUTni to neighbors.
end if
end if
end for
Transaction Phase
Client cT provides Signed(T, INcT ) (and PK = ∅) to the
first Ncon gradient nodes.
for Each node ni receiving Signed(T, INcT ) and PK do
if First time receiving T then
if Signature path holds then
Update PK ← PK⋃{PKni}
Send Signed(T, INcT ) and PK to the gradient
node.
end if
end if
end for
centive and routing mechanisms, intermediary nodes also have
incentives to propagate the block since they share processing
fees. Even more, the ones who are closer to the leader would
have higher motivation since they probably gain from more
transactions.
Storage efficiency. Any propagation incentive mechanism
requires additional data storage than the data itself to keep
track of the propagation path. Previous works having incentive
[16], [17] utilize signature chains where each node signs the
transaction and the public key of the receiver. Therefore,
additional to the transaction, the signature package of each
propagating node is included. On the other hand, our solution
with the path identification benefits from the recognition phase
of the routing protocol, and its additional storage requirement
is only the public keys of propagating nodes and a signature
of the client. Since the ability to claim propagation reward and
the validation of the path need to be available, our propagation
mechanism demands minimal storage components.
Privacy of the intermediary nodes. Signature chains and
the proposed path identifier yield a direct connection between
nodes network ID and their public keys. Unlike signature
chains, our solution consists of two phases and the propagating
nodes validate it by checking whether their input is preserved
or not. This enables us to tackle the privacy issue by replac-
ing plain public keys with commitments. Instead of directly
including a public key, each node can obscure it in a simple
commitment with a random number (CTi = H(PKi, Ri)).
All verifications can be handled with the commitments while
claiming propagation reward requires to reveal it. The com-
mitment version uses the same network structure without
compromising the identities of the nodes except clients and
the round leader. The location of the round leader and clients
will be known to their neighbors. They may need to update
their key pairs or replace their connections for the next rounds.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this work, we investigated two transaction propagation
related problems of blockchains: incentive and bandwidth
efficiency. We presented an incentive mechanism encourag-
ing nodes to propagate messages, and a routing mechanism
reducing the redundant communication cost.
We analyzed the necessary and sufficient conditions provid-
ing an incentive to propagate messages as well as to deviate
participants (nodes) from introducing Sybil nodes. We studied
different types of network topologies and we showed the
impossibility result of the Sybil-proofness for the 1-connected
model. We formulated the incentive-compatible propagation
mechanism and proved that it obeys the rational behavior.
We presented a new aspect of the consensus algorithms,
namely first-leader-then-block protocols. We proposed a smart
routing mechanism for these protocols, which reduces the
redundant transaction propagation from the size of the network
to the scale of average shortest path length. Finally, we
combined incentive and routing mechanisms in a compatible
and memory-efficient way.
Future work and open questions. In Section IV-D, we
mentioned the parameter choice and possible outcomes of
the incentive mechanism. Detailed effect of incentive model
and parameter choice are left as a future work. Another open
question is the effect of the incentive mechanism on the
topology of the network. Nodes would benefit from increasing
their connection to contribute more transaction propagations,
i.e., it would increase the connectivity of the network. Using
that result, a rigorous analysis on the choice of the C parameter
can be done. Finally, there are open problems regarding the
economics of the transaction fee: analyzing the accuracy of the
de facto formulas in the existing cryptocurrencies with respect
to the cost of the propagation and validation and investigating
the possible impacts of the sharing fee like decentralization
effect.
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